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1. Life on Mars?  
 
In early 2018 NASA announced that they had found organic matter on Mars (Potter 2018). 
Specifically, researchers drilled into Martian rocks and heated them at high temperatures, catalyzing 
the release of organic molecules trapped there in 3.5-billion-year-old mudslides (Eigenbrode et al. 
2018). This finding was presented in major media outlets as an enticing step forward in the search 
for life on Mars (for example, Chang 2018; Sample 2018).  
 
Organic matter had been found on Mars before, just not in anything near these concentrations 
(Eigenbrode et al. 2018). Also, these organic molecules are of a sort that could have been produced 
by life, but could also be produced abiotically, by purely chemical processes. In other words, if life 
with the biochemistry of Earth life were around, then we would expect to find these sorts of 
molecules. But finding these sorts of molecules does not mean that life is, or even was, around. 
 
Claims varied about the bearing of this finding on the search for life. Here are some representative 
examples:  
Are there signs of life on Mars? … We don’t know, but these results tell us we are on the 
right track. (Potter 2018) 
 
Whether it holds a record of ancient life, is the food for extant life, or has existed in the 
absence of life, organic matter in martian materials holds chemical clues to planetary 
conditions and processes. (Eigenbrode et al. 2018) 
 
It’s not a direct indicator that life may have existed on Mars. (Tamblyn 2018) 
 
This variation is understandable, regarding whether and to what extent this finding points to life. 
First of all, there are further empirical and theoretical questions to address about the significance of 
such a finding. Second of all, there is no consensus on what life is in the first place. This chapter 
will discuss three ways that answers to the question ‘What is life?’ can vary, and how this variation 
might bear on life detection efforts in astrobiology. 
 
A natural place to start in thinking about what this recent discovery can tell us about life is the 
‘NASA definition’ of life: “Life is a self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian 
evolution”. This definition was proposed several decades ago by Carl Sagan and popularized in 
subsequent discussion (Joyce et al. 1994), and is endorsed by NASA in the context of their life 
detection efforts.1  
 
There is no straightforward evidential link between the 2018 finding on Mars and the NASA 
definition of life. Of course, there is much more to the search for life than this definition. There are 
 
1 For example at astrobiology.nasa.gov/research/life-detection/about/; accessed March 2019. 
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more fine-grained background assumptions at stake which do not figure into this ‘official’ 
definition of life at face value: for example, about what life is, what life does, and what life requires. 
These sorts of assumptions drive the search for organic matter of the sort NASA recently 
discovered, along with its tentative designation as a small but real mark of success in the search for 
life on Mars. What this recent finding does is raise the likelihood that there could have been life 
forms on Mars that are biochemically a lot like life on Earth. That is significant, even if it does not 
bear much, at face value, on the closest thing to a candidate definition of life at stake here. 
 
This is not just NASA’s issue. Anyone looking for life in the universe is in a bit of a tough spot: It 
cannot be assumed that life elsewhere would resemble life as we know it, in even the most basic 
ways. So we need some way to recognize it that abstracts away from life as we know it. Many 
people have thought that coming up with a definition of life is a natural and appealing way to 
achieve this.  
 
 
2. Defining life and why it matters for astrobiology 
 
Here we run into a puzzle that philosophers and scientists have been arguing about for a long time. 
In the Western tradition, accounts of the debate about defining life tend to trace it back several 
millennia to Aristotle, who distinguished living from nonliving things in terms of functions like 
reproduction and nutrition. Since then, hundreds of others have weighed in, from early modern 
natural philosophers to contemporary philosophers and scientists. Some have attempted to define 
life in terms of a single property, like evolution or metabolism; others give a list of properties. Some 
definitions emphasize biochemical particulars; others are wholly functional. When someone 
proposes definitional criteria for life, someone else raises a counterexample (for example, if 
metabolism is sufficient for life, then candle flames arguably qualify as living; if reproduction is 
necessary for life, then sterile hybrids like mules are problematically disqualified). 
 
Other authors have surveyed extensively the landscape of proposed definitions of life and their 
various borderline cases and counterexamples (for example, Sagan 1970; Bedau 1998; Luisi 1998; 
Pályi et al. 2002; Popa 2004; Oliver and Perry 2006; Cleland and Chyba 2007; Bedau and Cleland 
2010; Trifonov 2011; Mix 2015; Mariscal and Doolittle 2018). I will not repeat their efforts here. 
The key points for the purpose of this chapter are that this landscape is substantial (with as many as 
100+ definitions of life (Popa 2004; Trifonov 2011)), proposed definitions of life vary widely, and 
there is no consensus on a definition among astrobiologists, let alone across disciplines with a stake 
in the matter.2 
 
Some have stressed the centrality, fundamentality, or necessity for biology of answering the 
question ‘What is life?’ (Cleland and Chyba 2007; Farnsworth et al. 2013; Mix 2015). But while 
some biologists are interested in that question, biologists in general do not need an answer to it. The 
subject matter of biology, the living world and its phenomena, is clear enough without one. 
Borderline cases for defining life do not cause problems for most biologists; for example, the lack 
of consensus on whether viruses are ultimately nonliving or living does not impede microbiologists’ 
study of bacteria and their viruses. 
 
In contrast to biologists in general, astrobiologists cannot take the status of their subject matter as 
living or nonliving for granted—its status as such is often precisely what is at stake. There are at 
least two reasons to think astrobiologists need an understanding of what counts as life. The first is 
 
2 These other disciplines include research on the origin of life, bottom-up synthetic biology, artificial life, and 
environmental ethics (see discussion in Machery (2012), Bich and Green (2017), Parke (in prep)). 
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to set search criteria for finding ‘life as we don’t know it’ in the universe. The second is to set 
success conditions conducive to agreement about when life has been found and when it has not.3 
 
In addition to particular cases like the recent Mars finding discussed in Section 1, the meaning of 
‘life’ figures into a broader agenda in astrobiology: looking for biosignatures. There are various 
ways to spell out what a biosignature is. Here are four sample characterizations: 
 
An observable feature of a planet, such as its atmospheric composition, that our 
present models cannot reproduce when including the abiotic physical and chemical 
processes we know about. (Léger et al. 2011; emphasis original)  
 
Distinctive suites of durable textural, mineralogical, or chemical indicators of life. 
(Campbell 2017) 
 
A feature whose presence or abundance requires a biological origin. (Des Marais et al. 
2001) 
 
Evidence that life exists or existed. (Benner 2010) 
 
There is a spectrum here from understandings of biosignatures that require some particular chemical 
or material assumptions about life, to those that do not. The first two rely on assumptions about 
biochemistry or the kinds of material traces life leaves; the latter two need not (note that on 
Benner’s characterization of a biosignature, artefacts qualify: If we found technology or AI 
elsewhere in the solar system, we could be pretty sure that life is or was there to create it (Benner 
2010)). 
 
Some understanding of what counts as life is built in to these understandings of what counts as a 
biosignature. Of course, biosignatures could be conceptualized, and candidate ones assessed, 
without a definition or even a hypothesis about life beyond life as we know it. We could just take 
everything we know about life on Earth—its biochemical constraints, its effects on the atmosphere, 
the microscopic and macroscopic phenomena and artefacts it produces, and so forth—and use that 
collection of observations to guide the search for biosignatures. Many people invested in finding 
life beyond Earth want more than that. They want to be in a position to find signatures of life that 
might be markedly unlike life as we know it, perhaps even at the basic biochemical level. 
 
This desire for grounds to identify ‘life as we don’t know it’ has been a key driver in the search for 
a definition of life (see discussion in Cleland 2012). Beyond the debate about which definition of 
life is the definition, in recent years there has also been a meta-debate taking place about the whole 
project itself. In particular, the proliferation of 100+ proposed candidate definitions of life has led 
some philosophers and scientists to dismiss the project of trying to define life as pointless or 
hopeless. This definition skepticism comes in at least three flavors (see discussion in Smith 2018). 
Carol Cleland has argued that there are too many problems facing the project of strictly defining 
life, including the sorts of counterexamples and borderline cases discussed above. She says what we 
need instead is a broader theory of life, but scientists are not in a position to formulate such a 
theory, because our knowledge of life is based on a single sample: it all descended from the same 
common ancestor and therefore shares key fundamental properties (Cleland and Chyba 2007; 
Cleland 2012). Edouard Machery (2012) has argued that scientists use a million different definitions 
of life, there is no reason to think they will converge on a single, unanimous one, and the project of 
defining life (as a scientific theoretical concept, anyway) is pointless. Jack Szostak (2012) has 
argued that science can proceed just fine without worrying about the definition of life, at least in the 
context of origin of life research. 
 
3 Research on the origin of life is of course another important part of the agenda of astrobiology. For the purpose of this 
chapter I am focusing in particular on the role of defining life in the search for life in the universe. 
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In response to these and other pessimists about defining life, several recent discussions have 
proposed that we should be pluralists about life. That is, we should accept that multiple, even 
conflicting definitions of life can co-exist, suited to different research agendas. A pluralist position 
denies that the aim of defining life is to settle on a single definition. In any case, only a subset of the 
100+ definitions of life referred to above are proper definitions in the strict sense that philosophers 
like to talk about: proposing necessary and sufficient conditions intended for unanimous 
acceptance. In practice, many so-called definitions of life are less strict. They are better understood 
as working characterizations of life, which are conceptual frameworks used to guide and make 
sense of research in a given context, tailored to the agenda of a particular group or field with a stake 
in understanding life. This is in line with Cleland’s (2012) suggestion that astrobiologists search for 
life with ‘tentative criteria’, rather than strict definitions, in mind. For further discussion of this idea 
that definitions of life are often more operational or provisional, and that it is not such bad thing to 
have more than one of them, see (Oliver and Perry 2006; Griesemer 2015; Mix 2015; Bich and 
Green 2017). 
 
The combined views of the pessimists and the pluralists point to a grim outlook for settling on a 
unanimous definition of life, at least today. The positions of pluralism about life, and the more 
relaxed understanding of what qualifies as a definition, are controversial but popular in the current 
literature on life—I will not argue for them at length here. For the rest of this chapter I will assume 
these two positions and ask: How do the ways life is defined bear on scientific practice in 
astrobiology? In particular, how can the ways life is defined affect how astrobiologists understand 
search criteria and success conditions for finding life in the universe? 
 
3. Three ways to define life  
 
Existing discussions of ways to define life have focused on the content of different definitions, 
categorizing them into clusters such as evolutionary versus thermodynamic versus metabolic 
definitions of life. This is often for the purpose of assessing the relative merits and implications of 
different categories, and endorsing one category as fundamental (Sagan 1970; Pályi et al. 2004; 
Popa 2004; Kompanichenko 2008; Trifonov 2011; Mix 2015). Below I discuss something different: 
three ways to categorize definitions that vary in their strategies or commitments regarding how life 
is defined. These abstract away from the specific content or focal feature(s) of definitions of life. 
There are at least three such dimensions along which definitions of life can vary: Treating 
living/nonliving as a dichotomy or a matter of degree, defining living individuals or living 
collectives, and defining life materially or functionally.4 I discuss each in turn and suggest how 
variation in each dimension can affect the role of the concept of life in setting search criteria or 
success conditions in astrobiology. 
 
3.1. Living/nonliving: Dichotomy or matter of degree? 
 
Most proposed definitions of life offer a way to distinguish between two categories, living and 
nonliving. In particular, they specify criteria for drawing a line that will include what is living and 
exclude what is nonliving. A paradigm example of this is Maturana and Varela’s “All that is living 
must be based on autopoiesis, and if a system is discovered to be autopoietic, that system is defined 
as living, i.e., it must correspond to the definition of minimal life” (1973, cited in Popa 2004). An 
alternative is to treat the difference between living and nonliving explicitly as a continuum, or a 
matter of degree. Several recent accounts have done this: they specify a few features as definitional 
of life, but life comes in degrees. Christophe Malaterre’s (2010) account specifies five features 
 
4 These are three important ones; I think there are others as well. For example, other relevant dimensions include (1) 
pragmatic versus theoretical definitions of life, and (2) whether life is treated as a (natural) kind, as is the norm, or not 
(for arguments that life is not a natural kind see Hermida 2017; Mariscal and Doolittle 2018).  
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(individuation, replication, variation, metabolism, and coupling of components) and allows systems 
to instantiate each of those features to varying degrees. Mark Bedau’s (2012) account specifies 
three features (a container, program, and metabolism) and allows for a spectrum of Boolean 
combinations of those features and their relationships of mutual support and integration, shading 
from nonliving to living. On these matter-of-degree accounts, there is no matter of fact about a clear 
line between what is nonliving and living, just a gradual scale.  
 
Treating nonliving/living as a dichotomy versus a matter of degree will make a difference to the 
sorts of claims that can be made about life in the universe. Much of the debate about life has treated 
the matter of defining life as if the aim is to demarcate two kinds or categories, living and nonliving. 
A clean divide between what is nonliving and what is living might seem naturally appealing in the 
context of finding life in the universe. It would be nice to have unambiguous yes-or-no answers 
when candidate life forms are identified. It would be nice—once the empirical details are sorted out, 
which is of course no small matter—to be able to say in a given case that life-detection missions 
like NASA’s had either found life, or had not. 
 
On the other hand, understanding life as a matter of degree better reflects the truth of the matter in 
thinking about the origin of life, on Earth or anywhere. It makes sense for the search for life on 
other planets to understand life in a way that explicitly captures the possibility of discovering not 
only living or nonliving things, but also intermediaries: minimal or marginal cases of life, where life 
is understood as something that comes in degrees. Astrobiologists are not looking only for living 
organisms or populations. They are looking for evidence that life could have once existed elsewhere 
in the universe, or could be in the process of emerging elsewhere. To the extent that the latter 
constitutes part of the agenda of searching for life, it makes sense to conceptualize life as a matter 
of degree. 
 
If living/nonliving is understood as a matter of degree rather than two dichotomous categories, the 
possibility space for interpreting life-detection findings, like the ones discussed at the outset of this 
chapter, can be understood differently. Discussions have tended to frame that possibility space in 
terms of three options: life was found, life was not found, or the results are ambiguous between 
biotic and abiotic explanations. A fourth option—which is consistent with the third option, but 
backgrounded in discussions treating living/nonliving as a dichotomy—could be that there are 
systems on Mars (for example) best understood as transitional between paradigm cases of nonlife 
and paradigm cases of life, as one would have found on Earth sometime in the window between 
roughly 4.3 and 3.8 billion years ago. A clearer shared understanding of the in-between status of 
such not-fully-living (but not nonliving) forms would be an ideal starting point for detecting them. 
 
 
3.2 Living individuals or collectives? 
 
Many existing definitions of life propose grounds to separate living organisms, like lizards and 
lactobacilli, from nonliving things like liposomes and laptops. This is a natural way to understand 
the question ‘What is life?’—in terms of what makes living individuals living. Some definitions of 
life, however, are based on properties that by definition apply only to collectives of individuals, or 
collectives of individuals over time. An example of the former sort of property is variation; an 
example of the latter sort is evolution. These appear in many popular definitions of life, including 
the NASA definition discussed in Section 1. When variation or evolution are cited as definitional 
features of life, the bearer of those features is a population, not an individual. So while the question 
is often interpreted as asking what distinguishes a living thing (organism) from a nonliving thing, a 
number of authors treat living populations (for example, Bedau 1998, Smith 2018) or even the 
biosphere (Lovelock 1979, Feinberg and Shapiro 1980) as the focal unit in characterizing life, rather 
than individual organisms. 
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There is no principled reason to prefer defining living individuals to defining living collectives, nor 
is there any principled problem with including features of both levels of biological organization in 
the same definition of life. Plenty of definitions do this. But there are some potential conceptual 
complications with this, in the context of searching for life in the universe. 
 
The features emphasized in definitions of life are not always the same as the features targeted by 
life-detection tools and techniques. Furthermore, they are often framed at a different level (that of 
individual organisms versus collectives of them). Biologists and astrobiologists use different tools 
and timescales to look for evidence of evolutionary processes in nature, as opposed to evidence of 
living things, like microbes. Regarding tools, the 1976 Mars Viking missions involved techniques 
by which researchers could in principle identify traces of microbes and their metabolic activity; the 
same is true for bids for sites for the upcoming 2020 Rover missions. These approaches to finding 
life in the universe prioritize looking for evidence of microbial life forms, not (direct) evidence of 
evolution or variation. There are other ways to look for evolution and variation. With our familiar 
microbial Earth life, this is typically done by looking for genetic markers (ribosomal RNA 
sequences) and their change over time, or their differences with respect to one another or to a 
putative common ancestor. It is not obvious how these methods would translate to looking for life 
as we don’t know it, given their reliance on particulars not only of DNA-based biochemistry but of 
conserved genome regions common to familiar life. 
 
Regarding timescales, if life is understood purely in terms of features of individual organisms and 
we are searching for one, we could in principle find one (or evidence of one) in an instant. Finding 
evolutionary processes, or direct evidence of them, has to be done over time (but see Benner 2010 
for a suggested way around this, discussed in Section 3 below). So variation in this feature of how 
life is defined could make an empirical and theoretical difference. Specifying criteria for finding 
living individuals, versus living evolving populations, can influence the kinds of signatures of life 
astrobiologists look for, the tools they use to look for them, and the timescales on which they can do 
so. Of course, the projects of searching for living individuals and evolving populations are 
compatible, and can be pursued concurrently. But they can be conceptually and practically 
distinguished in ways that matter for astrobiology. 
 
 
3.3. Material or functional? 
 
Some definitions of life specify material particulars like biochemistry, carbon-based biochemistry, 
or nucleic acids. For example, Perrett (1952) defines life as “a potentially self-perpetuating system 
of linked organic reactions, catalyzed stepwise and almost isothermally by complex and specific 
organic catalysts which are themselves produced by the system.” Other definitions are purely 
functional, and invite a variety of material or even digital instantiations of life as we don’t know it. 
An example is “life is self-reproduction with variation” (Trifonov 2011), which could be 
instantiated by familiar carbon-based life, silicon-based life, self-replicating computer programs, 
and any number of other systems, chemical or otherwise. How material or functional a definition is 
can come in degrees: for example, Perrett’s ‘linked organic reactions’ specifies a more fine-grained 
material feature than the NASA definition’s criterion that life is a ‘chemical system’. Furthermore, 
many definitions of life combine material and functional elements. 
 
Purely functional definitions leave more room for finding life in the universe that does not resemble 
our current sample of life in even its most basic biochemical aspects. On the other hand, they give 
less guidance about what to look for. Many definitions of life combine functional with loosely 
material elements—they are based on a coarse-grained material understanding of life with reference 
to chemistry, but without more fine-grained assumptions about molecular specifics like nucleic 
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acids. These include, for example, the NASA definition, and Pace’s (2011) definition of life as “a 
self-replicating, evolving system expected to be based on organic chemistry”. 
 
The more material details a definition of life specifies, the more readily it allows for direct specific 
claims about biosignatures: what specifically to search for, or whether a particular finding qualifies 
as life or a sign of life. Purely functional definitions will not do this directly. But they can provide a 
template for more specific guidance on searching for life, once the appropriate details are filled in. 
Benner (2010) exemplifies this sort of reasoning, connecting a relatively functional definition of life 
to more specific claims about biochemical signatures of life. He takes the NASA definition (“life is 
a self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution”) as a starting point, and 
supplements it with the assumption that chemical systems capable of Darwinian evolution must be 
based on polyelectrolites (molecules with repeating charges in their backbone). He argues that we 
should focus the search for life on polyelectrolites, and evidence of polyelectrolites would qualify 





I have discussed three dimensions on which accounts of life can vary, and suggested that variation 
along each of these dimensions can affect how the concept of life figures in to theoretical and 
empirical efforts in astrobiology: in forming search criteria for life in the universe, understanding 
success conditions, and communicating about them. In summary: 
 
• Living/nonliving as a dichotomy or a matter of degree: Dichotomous understandings of 
living/nonliving might seem conducive to clearer answers about the status of discoveries in the 
universe; matter-of-degree understandings are conducive to clearly recognizing transitional 
entities as such. 
• Living individuals or collectives: Focusing on features of individual life forms (such as self-
reproduction and metabolism), versus features of collectives of individuals (such as variation and 
evolution), can influence both conceptual search criteria for life and the tools and techniques 
involved. 
• Material versus functional understandings of life: More material understandings of life give 
clearer guidance without supplementation with auxiliary assumptions. More functional 
understandings leave more room for interpretation and enable searching for ‘life as we don’t 
know it’ at even the most basic chemical level. 
 
The second and third dimensions, especially, are not straightforward either/or choices. For example, 
some definitions of life specify only properties of individuals, some specify only properties of 
populations, and others explicitly address both (for example, Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). Definitions 
can be specifically material, permissively functional, or in between. So these three dimensions do 
not give us a simple possibility space of eight ways to define life. Rather, we can think of them as 
axes along which approaches to defining life can be assessed or compared. 
 
The aim of this short chapter is not to make value judgments about the superiority of any particular 
way to define of life, along any of these three dimensions—at least not in a wholesale way across 
astrobiology, let alone across fields with a stake in the concept of life (see footnote 2). Rather, this 
is a call for clearer communication about which understanding of life is at stake in the context of a 
given project or finding. And, specifically, how that understanding of life relates to search criteria 
and success conditions for finding life or signs of life. Explicitly recognizing a plurality of ways to 
define life in the sense discussed here (in addition to the range of focal features regarded as 
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definitional of life) is a starting point for clearer discussion of the background assumptions at stake 
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